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COMMENT:
EQUILIBRIUM IN A TECHNOLOGY-
SPECIFIC PATENT SYSTEM
Mark D. Janist
I am happy to have the opportunity to comment on a series of
articles by Professors Dan Burk and Mark Lemley.1 All of these
works explore a pair of claims: patent law rules are (to some ex-
tent) and should be (to a greater extent) tailored to specific tech-
nologies.
The descriptive claim is not particularly startling. Of course
patent law is technology-specific, at least at the level of specific
claims adjudicated in specific cases.2 The normative claim, how-
ever, deserves close scrutiny, and, unfortunately, Burk and Lemley
have given us an abundance of interesting material to scrutinize.
The Burk and Lemley project envisions a complex patent law
regime composed of a mixture of (1) a small core of technology-
neutral principles, and (2) a large and growing set of technology-
specific applications of those principles. For me, the proposed
mixture of principles raises two sorts of questions. First, what are
the jurisprudential implications? Second, and perhaps more im-
portantly, what are the institutional implications?
The answers to these questions may ultimately determine
whether we should applaud or weep in response to the Burk and
Lemley proposals. I suggest that we applaud, but I reserve the
right to weep.
Professor of Law and H. Blair & Joan V. White Intellectual Property Law Scholar,
University of Iowa College of Law.
' Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Biotechnology's Uncertainty Principle, 54 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 691 (2004) [hereinafter Burk & Lemley, Biotechnology's Uncertainty Principle];
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1155 (2002); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575 (2003).
2 Or, to put it more succinctly, "duh."
743
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
I. JURISPRUDENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF POLICY LEVERS
The Burk and Lemley proposals prompt several questions
about the future character of patent jurisprudence. One threshold
question is whether we will even be able to talk about a unitary
patent law jurisprudence if the Burk and Lemley proposals are im-
plemented. Might we instead find ourselves confronted with fifty-
seven patent law jurisprudences, each specifically tailored to par-
ticular technologies?
Beyond the threshold question is a serious question about
equilibrium. Burk and Lemley propose a system that will equili-
brate around a small number of technology-neutral principles, and
then a larger number of technology-specific applications, or policy
levers. Is it really possible to achieve that kind of equilibrium? I
have a number of reservations.
First, it might not be very easy to articulate and agree upon
what the technology-neutral principles really are. What is the
source of these principles? The Constitution? The statute? Which
doctrines form the substantive content of these principles? Obvi-
ousness? Equivalency? Strict liability for infringement, the pre-
sumption of validity, the correlation between disclosure and claim
scope? Are those the irreducible minimum? How would we
know?
Second, even if we can figure out what the technology-neutral
principles are, how can we be sure that they are going to persist?
For example, suppose that we identify obviousness as one of the
technology-neutral principles, but we subsequently decide that in-
novation in some technological areas will proceed better if we
have no obviousness requirement, or at most a very minimal one.
Does obviousness then disappear from the list of technology-
neutral principles? What if we find that innovation will proceed
better in some other technological areas if we have what amounts
to anticopy protection, or an intent requirement? Does strict liabil-
ity for infringement then likewise disappear from the core of tech-
nology-neutral principles? The Burk and Lemley proposals seem
likely to generate a cascade effect in which technology-neutral
principles disappear and are replaced by multiple technology-
specific rules.
Perhaps the Burk and Lemley proposals should give greater
attention to elucidating controls that would guard against the dis-
solution of technology-neutral principles and thereby maintain
some level of systemic coherence. For example, perhaps the Fed-
eral Circuit should be encouraged to announce explicitly in its
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opinions which principles belong to the central core, and which
constitute technology-specific applications.
The Federal Circuit may shift the equilibrium between tech-
nology-general principles and technology-specific rules in other
ways as well. The Federal Circuit abhors a vacuum. Under the
Burk and Lemley regime, when the Federal Circuit is applying
specially tailored policy levers for biotechnology, for example, can
the court resist the temptation to say something that sounds like
big law-technology-general law? Such statements have a pro-
pensity for finding their way into the patent law firmament, and
not always within the technology-specific context in which they
first arose.
A third reservation concerns boundary issues. How do we
minimize costly ancillary litigation over boundary issues in the
proposed regime? Mark Lemley mentioned many examples of the
kind of boundary issues emanating from technology-specific stat-
utes. 3 He proposed that judges resolve these issues, and gave rea-
sons why Congress is not well-suited for the task.4 I agree with
the skepticism about the effectiveness of technology-specific stat-
utes, but I wonder whether the sheer number of boundary disputes
might strain the skills of even the most sophisticated patent judges.
For example, in a regime that features biotechnology-specific
rules, innumerable ancillary disputes could arise about whether the
patented subject matter in controversy can be categorized as bio-
technology. We are also likely to see many intractable disputes
about what is or is not software. The Burk and Lemley proposals
stimulate the creation of subject matter boundaries, suggesting that
there is great potential for controversy over those boundaries.
Consider the following example directed to biotechnology.
Burk and Lemley argue that, if one thinks carefully about innova-
tion in biotechnology, one concludes that high obviousness and
low disclosure requirements would be preferred over the reverse.5
But the Burk and Lemley proposals discuss biotechnology as if it
were a monolith. Is it really? Should innovation policy be uni-
form across all areas of biotechnology? Or might innovation pol-
icy for biomedicine differ materially from innovation policy for
agricultural biotechnology, which might, in turn, differ from ap-
propriate innovation policy for some other area of biotechnology?
Moreover, each of these individualized judgments about innova-
3 Mark A. Lemley, Remarks at the Case Western Reserve University School of Law Cen-
ter for Law, Technology and the Arts Symposium: The Past, Present, and Future of the Federal
Circuit (Nov. 14, 2003) (transcript on file with the Case Western Reserve Law Review).
4 id.
3 Burk & Lemley, Biotechnology's Uncertainty Principle, supra note 1, at 691.
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tion policy is very likely to require revision over time. We might
end up with an insurmountable number of boundaries to police, a
regime of near-infinite specificity.
Finally, when the Burk and Lemley article discusses custom-
izing patent law standards to fit particular technologies, are they in
fact talking about customizing standards?6 Might they instead be
talking about customizing evidence? For example, they suggest
that we customize notions of the person of ordinary skill in the art.
But the suggestions seem to favor the creation of additional legal
standards, such as separate rules about timing for the "person of
ordinary skill" inquiry in obviousness and that inquiry in enable-
ment.
Perhaps we don't really need additional changes of technol-
ogy-specific rules; instead, perhaps we need better technology-
specific evidence. The Federal Circuit could play a role by devel-
oping mechanisms to guide litigants in developing such evidence,
and by encouraging litigants to develop a detailed factual record
on the applicable person of ordinary skill.7
II. INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
The Burk and Lemley proposals also prompt a variety of
questions regarding institutional concerns. How will institutional
competencies affect the ultimate goal of fitting patent law with
innovation policy in specific industries? For example, if we have
technology-specific patent law, does that mean that we need to
have technology-specific patent law institutions to fit with this
technology-specific patent law?
First, consider how institutional arrangements may influence
substantive patentability standards, as applied in patent examina-
tion. If the Federal Circuit elaborates specialized patentability
standards for biotechnology, is it also preferable under the Burk
and Lemley proposals to have specialized biotechnology patent
examination? Arguably, we already have specialized examination
within art units, and examination does not proceed uniformly
across those art units, as evidenced by empirical studies. But ex-
aminers are still bound together by the common culture of the Pat-
ent and Trademark Office ("PTO"), which may continually coun-
terbalance the tendency toward differential examination.
6 See id. at 708.
7 See Velander v. Garner, 348 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2003), for an example of an elaborate
discussion on a factual record on the person of ordinary skill in a particular field in biotechnol-
ogy.
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Do the Burk and Lemley proposals require or encourage the
rearrangement of institutions to facilitate differential examination?
In this regard, the proposals may tie in with the PTO's twenty-first
century strategic plan, which discusses contracting out search ca-
pabilities and prior art search services.8 Such an arrangement
could lead to divergent prior art searches across technology areas,
which could, in turn, play a role in stimulating the development of
disparate, technology-specific patentability standards.
Second, consider how institutional arrangements might influ-
ence the presumption of validity. If we had a regime of truly spe-
cialized technology-specific patent examinations, then logically we
would end up with different treatment of the presumption of valid-
ity in different industries. I am not certain whether we should ap-
plaud or weep. This is another illustration of the phenomenon that
I previously discussed, in which the technology-specific applica-
tion of technology-neutral patent principles might push back
against those principles. Even if we initially characterized the pre-
sumption of validity as a technology-neutral principle, it may turn
out that we simply cannot defend a unitary presumption of valid-
ity. We would have to eliminate it from the list of supposedly
technology-neutral principles.
Third, consider how institutional arrangements might influ-
ence obviousness. Suppose we decided to implement a higher ob-
viousness standard in biotechnology. What would that really
mean? The art is the art, so a "higher" obviousness standard might
really mean that the PTO offers thinner evidentiary support for an
initial finding of motivation to combine prior art references. Sup-
pose that applicants respond by filing more elaborate expert affi-
davit evidence. Because the PTO cannot hire its own experts, it
might systematically lose these battles. That is, as a matter of the
relevant institutional arrangements, it might simply be unrealistic
to expect the PTO to be able to sustain a "heightened" obviousness
standard. Heightened obviousness may have to be left to the few
cases that actually reach the courts.
While the preceding observations focus predominantly on the
PTO, the Burk and Lemley proposals also have implications for
the institutional infrastructure for patent infringement litigation.
For example, the possibility of specialized trial level patent adju-
dication. If we have technology-specific patent law, do we need to
have technology-specific trial level adjudication? I do not think
that Burk and Lemley propose that, and I am not very sympathetic
8 U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC PLAN 4 (up-
dated Feb. 3, 2003), at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat21/stratplanO3feb2OO3.pdf.
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to such a proposal. If it turns out that much of what we are dis-
cussing is factual, then there may be pressure to create a special-
ized technology-savvy bench. This is quite ironic. The general
thrust of the Burk and Lemley proposals is to tell the Federal Cir-
cuit to flex its muscles, to use the discretion that the statute pro-
vides the court to deploy policy levers in a technology-specific
way. Suppose that the Federal Circuit does so. Suppose that the
exercise demonstrates that technological specificity means fact-
specificity, factual nuance. And suppose further that it is plain to
everyone that the Federal Circuit, as an appellate tribunal, really is
not well-suited to adjudicating nuanced disputes over facts-
instead, that task is better conducted by a trial-level forum, par-
ticularly a technologically-savvy trial-level forum. The Federal
Circuit, by exercising its power, will divest itself of that very
power. It is hard for me to imagine the Federal Circuit deliber-
ately acting as the agent of its own undoing.
Professors Burk and Lemley have produced a very intriguing
project, and I am interested in the next three, four, seven or eight
papers that this project is bound to generate. Thank you.
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